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Goffman Unbound:

A New Paradigm for Social and Behavioral Science

Thomas J. Scheff

(see http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/ for further work)

Preface

Part I: Goffman’s Legacy.

1. Introduction: The Life and Work of Genius

The Goffman Style: Deconstructing Society and Social Science Looking Glass Self: Goffman as Symbolic Interactionist

Part II: Building on Goffman

4. Goffman’s World of Emotions

5. The Structure of Context: Deciphering Frame Analysis

6. Building an Onion: Alternatives to Biopsychiatry

Part III: Filling the Gaps

7. What Is This Thing Called Love?

8. Hatred as Shame and Rage

9. Human Bonds: Love, Pride, and Shame

10. Masculinity and Emotions: the Silence/Violence Pattern

11. A Theory of Runaway Nationalism

12. Conclusion

Preface

Erving Goffman, Norbert Elias and Harvey Sachs may have been the three most gifted sociologists of the 20th century. Goffman’s work, however, has been little used as a resource, unlike that of Sachs and Elias. There has been substantial commentary, but no body of Goffmanian work has resulted. Not ignored, to say the least, but at this writing its meaning and usefulness have not been established.

This book has three main goals. First to explicate Goffman’s achievements more clearly and directly than has been the case so far. Secondly, to show how some of them might be extended or modified to be of greater use. Finally, to discuss some of the gaps and shortcomings, and what might be done about them. The three parts of this book undertake these three goals.

To carry out this plan, I have called upon my earlier sketch of a part/whole approach(1997), and the framework developed by Bernard Phillips (2001; 2002) that emphasizes the use of interrelated concepts. Part/Whole analysis focuses on the need to link what Spinoza called “the least parts” to the “greatest wholes.” Spinoza’s point was that human beings are so complex that we have no chance to understand them unless we link the smallest parts and the largest wholes. For my purposes I have identified the least parts of human conduct as the words, gestures, thoughts and feelings in particular social interactions, and the greatest wholes with social institutions and abstract theories.

Phillips’s Web of Concepts approach overlaps to some extent with the Part/Whole idea, but has a somewhat different emphasis. His approach, like mine, puts human complexity in the forefront, and also emphasizes, like mine, the need to shuttle up and down the concrete/abstract ladder. Phillips also urges an aspect of research that has not been explicit in my earlier work, the need for reflexiveness, of including the researcher her- or himself in the overall picture. Phillips’s approach differs from mine in proposing the use of many conventional concepts as the basis for scholarship, such as stratification, personality, social structure, etc. My own approach has been to develop new concepts for each study, and to attempt to be integrate disciplines, sub-disciplines, and levels of analysis.

The feature that Goffman, Phillips and I share is the attempt to get outside the box, beyond the conventions of our society and of social science. Although Goffman cited other scholars, most of his work was utterly original. He eschewed conventional approaches, seeking rather to re-ground social science in a new language with new concepts. How did he embark on such an odyssey?

Goffman’s main focus was what might be called the microworld of emotions and relationships. We all live in it everyday of our lives, yet we have been trained not to notice. Since Goffman noticed it, he was the discoverer of a hidden world. His work, if properly construed, provides a window into that otherwise invisible world. This world is important for many reasons. For brevity I will mention only two obvious ones: First, it is important in its own right, since it constitutes the moment-by-moment texture of our lives. Secondly, it is intimately connected to the larger world; it both causes and is caused by that world. If we are to have more than a passing understanding of ourselves and our society, we need to become better acquainted with the emotional/relational world.

A New Yorker cartoon conveyed the idea that we avoid knowledge of this world. A man lying on the analyst’s couch is saying: “Call it denial if you will, but frankly I think that my personal life is none of my own damn business.”

CARTOON (to be added only in final draft, because of megabytes)

Although humor is often based on exaggeration, the idea that our personal lives are none of our own damn business comes close to the truth of the matter, or at least more truth than poetry. The patient in the cartoon being a man, rather than a woman, is also significant. Men, more than women, are trained to ignore the details that reveal the nature of emotions and relationships. Their attention is diverted elsewhere. But both women and men know much less about this world (for short, the ERW) than the larger one.

Our obliviousness could be a creation of the modern urban/industrial society. In traditional societies, the ERW was virtually the only world there was. In modern societies there are so many duties, distractions, and diversions that most of us learn to ignore the ERW, except in crisis.

Conventional social science mostly ignores emotions and relationships in favor of behavior and cognition. Goffman’s recognition of the existence of an ERW is the foundation of his whole approach. He realized, at some level, that conventional social and behavioral science was blind to the ERW, and might well be as blind in many other arenas as well.

Following Goffman’s lead, if we are going to advance in our understanding of the human condition, we need to build a new approach. This approach would not only include the ERW, but other hitherto unrecognized structure and process as well, such as the filigree of emotions and relationships that underlies large scale behavior, as in the case of collective cooperation and conflict.

Limitations of Goffman’s Work

Goffman’s work is a wholesale attack on this problem: how can we make the invisible, the backstage he sometimes called it, visible? Not that he had all the answers. His work provides pathways for approach to only some of the facets of the problem. His treatment of emotions, for example, is crucial on embarrassment and shame, and to a much smaller extent, disgust, but he has almost nothing to say about other important emotions, such as fear, pride, and love. Similarly, his approach to relationships is inspired on loneliness, disconnectedness and alienation, but omits the opposite pole: solidarity, secure bonds, and moments of profound unity.

Another significant problem with Goffman’s approach is his writing. It is brilliant, suggestive and entertaining, but also playful and teasing, revealing and concealing. Furthermore, he never steps back to summarize the implications of what he had to say, let alone to get very far in systematizing any of it. His style violates what might be considered the first rule of scientific and scholarly writing: the thesis should be stated clearly, and more than once, so that there can be no mistake about the main goal. It is customary to invoke the basic thesis at various levels of specificity five times: in the title, abstract, first paragraph, text, and conclusion. Much of Goffman’s writing provides either no thesis at all or one that is so elliptic as to be virtually useless, if not misleading.

There is another problem with understanding Goffman’s work that is somewhat unusual: his reputation as a “character” among people who knew him, and even among those who didn’t. Although he died in 1981, his reputation as a character continues, and casts something of a shadow over his work. This issue will be considered in several chapters.

The main emphasis will be to use Goffman’s approach to the ERW as a starting point. The introduction summarizes the primary features of Goffman’s work, and shows some links to his life. The chapters in Part I seek to derive, and state outright, flatfootedly, if necessary, some of Goffman’s main theses, particularly with respect to the ERW as he saw them. Part II shows some of the implications of his ideas for future research. Part III outlines my modifications, extensions and supplements to the framework that Goffman provided.

In my own work I have, at times intentionally, but usually inadvertently, dealt with gaps in Goffman’s approach, both in the microworld, and to linking this world to large-scale social change. Just as Marx was the discoverer of the vast world of political economy and its effects on civilizations, Goffman discovered the empire of the ERW, which complements and extends Marx’s analysis of feast and famine, peace and war, and many other aspects of the human condition.

Marxian and Goffmanian analysis provide vistas for exploring two basic dimensions of societies. The first focuses on political/economic structure/process, especially power and ranking of groups. Social integration, on the other hand, concerns solidarity and alienation, independently of power and rank. In the last section of this book, I link the ERW to social change in the larger world, particularly to the processes that lead to war and peace.

The last section outlines some of the most important implications for a new microsociology and its links to the larger world. In particular, this section connects Goffman’s work to his life, and to extensions of Phillips’s Web approach and to Part/Whole analysis. This book will foster complexity rather than simplification, concept development preliminary to systematic studies, and show paths between least parts and greatest wholes.

Part I

The first chapter is an introduction to Goffman’s life and work. It provides an overview of scholarly commentary on his work, and biographical material about his life, including some of my own encounters with him. Although there is considerable appreciation of Goffman’s work among scholars, it is mixed with, and much outweighed by criticism. Similarly, Goffman’s reputation as a person was quite mixed, with many people considering him to be, at best, an odd character. This chapter evaluates both the appreciative and critical sides, seeking to show links between his life and work. This issue is taken up again in Chapter 11, on hypermasculinity.

Chapter 2. Goffman’s greatest achievement seems to have been the creation of a vocabulary that enabled him to see the human condition in a new way. He was able to deconstruct not only specific conventional ideas of the self, mental illness, and, to some extent, gender, but also the whole conventional schema in modern societies, what has been called “the assumptive world.” In this respect he came nearest to carrying through the program of deconstructing/reconstructing the world of everyday life.

Chapter 3: Goffman’s best known work was Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. This chapter shows first that this book contains two somewhat conflicting theses, the more explicit one structural, the more hidden one, social psychological, spelling out in detail the ramifications of Cooley’s idea of the looking-glass self. The chapter’s main thrust is that contrary to most of the comments on this book, it focuses not only on embarrassment, but also on shame, either real or anticipated, as the basic emotions of most social transactions. The relationship between embarrassment and shame is further explored in this chapter, because Goffman’s work implies a close link, but doesn’t comment on it directly. Goffman’s treatment of the looking-glass self suggests that shame/embarrassment is the master emotion of social life.

Part II

Chapter 4: This chapter takes a broad look at Goffman’s treatment of emotions, comparing it with other writers like Freud, Elias, and the psychoanalyst Helen Block Lewis. There turns out to be considerable overlap in their approaches to emotion, in that all four place considerable emphasis on the role of shame/embarrassment in human conduct. What has made this emphasis problematic to this point is what might be called on a taboo on shame in Western societies. The chapter proposes that this taboo makes the emotional/relational world all but invisible in modern societies.

Chapter 5. Goffman’s longest most difficult and enigmatic book is Frame Analysis. What is the purpose of this book, and its main point? In this chapter I propose an answer to the problem: although Goffman doesn’t say it, this book takes a long step toward describing the structure of context. That is, the subjective and intersubjective context or background is so often so complex that it requires an assembly of premises. Goffman himself, and others, have hinted that this structure might require mathematical notation, which this chapter explores. This chapter also links frame analysis to earlier studies of the intersubjective structure of consensus, suggesting a model of social facts.

Chapter 6. Goffman’s book Asylums had considerable impact both on the mental health system and on the public at large. His critique of existing psychiatry is clear and passionate. However, his attempt to provide an alternative to the medical model is much less clear. One of the problems is that Goffman avoided any involvement in psychology, picturing himself as a structuralist. This chapter proposes a systems approach to mental illness, one that might encompass physical, psychological, and social aspects of the problem.

Part III

Chapter 7. As already indicated, love is one of the emotions that are absent in Goffman’s work. This chapter proposes an explicit definition of genuine love, both the romantic and non-romantic kinds. One facet of this definition rests on further elaboration of the idea of intersubjectivity proposed by Cooley and Goffman, along with two other facets. Attachment is a component of both romantic and non-romantic love, but (sexual) attraction is involved only in romantic love. Using the word attunement to mean balanced intersubjectivity between self and other, non-romantic love can be defined as made up of two A’s, attachment and attunement. Romantic love has three: attachment, attunement, and attraction. This definition serves to differentiate genuine love from look-alikes, such as infatuation, heartbreak, and lust alone, and to connect it to theories of social integration.

Chapter 8. Ordinary language serves to hide the meaning of both love and hate, particularly the processes that increase or decrease their intensity. This chapter proposes a conceptual definition of hate that parallels the definition of love in Chapter 7. The basic structure of hate, it is proposed, involves shame/anger sequence that goes unacknowledged. The proposed definitions of love and hate link both concepts to a theory of the social origins of pride and shame and therefore to a theory of social integration.

Chapter 9. Analysis of the emotional/relational word provides a path toward understanding the variety of human relationships, the various kinds of bonds that unite and divide individuals and groups. Using reports on dialogues in their families by students, this chapter shows the way in which the management of pride and shame both reflects and generates different kinds of bonds at the interpersonal level. This kind of analysis on a small and intimate scale provides the basis for applying ideas about social integration to large-scale cooperation and conflict between groups.

Chapter 10. One of the enigmas of the modern world is the way in which social groups seem to act against their own political and economic interests. Present day examples are working class support for a tax structure that benefits the wealthy, and gratuitous wars for which the working class provides the cannon fodder. This chapter proposes one component of the solution to this enigma, the way in which hypermasculinity results in mass support for destructive policies and warfare. In his lengthy essay “Where the Action Is,” Goffman inadvertently contributed to a model of hypermasculinity and its links to the ERW. This chapter uses Goffman’s idea of “character contests” as a way of explaining the link between the ERW and both interpersonal and group conflict.

Chapter 11. Particularly in issues of peace and war, the exact nature of nationalism may be crucial. This chapter continues the analysis in the last chapter by examining the emotional/relational bases of blind patriotism, my country right or wrong. This kind of nationalism is only part of the explanation of the actions of leaders of large groups, since warfare is usually in their economic and political interests. However, blind patriotism in public support for war is difficult to explain in this way; since it doesn’t seem to be in its interest. This chapter outlines how the interaction between alienation and unacknowledged shame might explain the puzzle.

Chapter 12. Identifying and exploring the ERW and its links to the macroworld makes for a new approach to human conduct. The last chapter reviews the main points of the book as a whole, and examines their implications for social and behavioral science. It shows how these considerations further extend the usefulness of Part/Whole Analysis and Phillips’s Web of Concepts. The new approach requires research begin with the development of at least one clearly defined concept through the careful examination of many and varied concrete instances.

Chapter 12. Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the main points made in this book, and their implications for future studies. What can we learn from Goffman’s work, the way he went about it, and from his life? In particular, what were his main areas of concern, achievements, shortcomings and omissions? Some of my own work has been used to show extensions of his ideas, and also overcoming his shortcomings and omissions. Goffman’s emphasis on trope clearing, and mine on concept development offer a new route for studying the human condition.

Goffman went quite far in deconstructing assumptive worlds, taken-for-granted conventional views of what is thought to be reality. He also provided a counter-world, based on a new lexicon for describing the social world. Although Goffman didn’t make it explicit, his work continually suggests the idea that human beings and their societies are much more complex then we usually assume. Finally, his lexicon and his application of it to concrete examples open up a whole arena of behavior and experience that is virtually invisible in modern societies, the emotional/relational world (ERW.)

Goffman’s primary achievement was creating a new vocabulary and a point of view to describe the social world. His lexicon was extensive enough to jolt many readers out of some of their most basic assumptions about what it means to be a human being. Reading Goffman’s work, in this respect, can be equivalent to living in another culture long enough to see one’s own culture and/or one’s self in a new way. Another similar experience, closer to home, is to lose one’s self in the novel of a master like Proust, or any other extraordinary book that opens up a new and hitherto unfamiliar world to the reader. Readers of Proust have remarked that in describing his own childhood, he was also describing theirs. Goffman has a similar effect on many of his readers.

Goffman realized, as did Schutz and Gouldner, that most people, including social scientists, live in “the world of everyday life,” taking it for granted as if it were the only possible world. Goffman’s work brings into living color the importance of Phillips’s focus on stratified worldviews, suggesting the way in which culture continually controls our daily life. If social science is going to do more than continually rediscover and confirm the status quo, it must be liberated from that straightjacket.

Goffman had some success in deconstructing specific elements in the assumptive world of modern societies. His greatest success was to make visible an aspect of human existent that had become dim in urban/industrial societies, the ERW. In modern societies, attention is almost entirely riveted onto the material world and, with respect to our selves and our fellows, cognition and behavior. Relationships and emotions lead only a shadow life in our scheme of the world.

The philosopher Wittgenstein had argued that ordinary language is sufficient for solving some problems, but is grossly inadequate for solving others. He went so far as stating that the use of the ordinary language lexicon in some areas is the reason that problems in that area are insoluble. One is entrapped in erroneous assumptions because they are embedded in ordinary language.

This idea was just a devout prayer for Wittgenstein, because he didn’t get very far in demonstrating how useful it might be. In this respect, Goffman’s work is an answer to Wittgenstein’s prayer. Goffman was devoted to the development of a new lexicon for the hitherto shadowy world of social interaction. He somehow sensed that in the English language at least, it is virtually impossible to describe the structure/process of interaction in ways that don’t merely confirm and justify it. The way that each of us is socialized leads us to that impression, and our relationships, emotions, and the very language we use continually reaffirm it.

As already indicated, the languages of modern societies, especially English, spotlight the material world, behavior and cognition. At the same time, they tend to edit out of existence emotions and social relationships. Even if one wishes to re-insert emotions and relationships into descriptions, it’s an uphill battle. The emotion and relationship lexicons in the languages of modern societies are confused and confusing. Chapters 3 and 4 described how narrowly shame is defined in English, as compared to other languages. Chapters 7 and 8 show an opposite tendency toward love and hate in English: they are defined so broadly as to be almost meaningless.

All of these confusions in the emotion lexicon function in the same way, to cover over relationship difficulties, especially disconnection and alienation. Shame is defined so narrowly as extremely negative that we tend not to notice its everyday versions. Love is defined so broadly that it is used to deny subtle, and in some instances, flagrant kinds of alienation.

The underlying assumption about emotions and relationships in English-speaking societies is that relative to the material world, behavior and cognition, they are UNIMPORTANT. They don’t matter, so why bother to even notice them? This is the trope for our time analogous to the idea in the ancient world that the earth was the center of the solar system. Until this trope was cleared, the science of astronomy was literally impossible.

Enter Goffman, giant-killer, trope-clearer. His studies of social interaction bring into the foreground the idea opposite to the ruling trope. The ERW is of critical importance, because we spend much of our lives, like fish in water, swimming in relationships and emotions. Worst yet, we spend an enormous amount of time and energy, knocking ourselves trying to act cool, as if the ERW doesn’t exist. This latter work, clearing our tracks of involvement in the ERW, probably requires more effort than the emotional/relational work itself. No matter how many specialized theories and studies using experiments, standardized scales and sample surveys, a science of social psychology will be impossible until the ruling trope is identified and cleared.

Goffman’s main ideas, such as impression management and character contests, go beneath the surface of social interaction and consciousness, into the hidden realms of vicissitudes and quality of relationships and their accompanying emotions. In this shadowy world, he savagely attacked individualistic ideas of the self, of psychiatry, femininity, and, inadvertently, masculinity. His examples of what at first glance seem to be commonplace interaction expose their complexity, the details of our everyday experience that we usually ignore. Since the assumptions of everyday life simplify the fine details, Goffman complicated.

With respect to the idea of the looking glass self, Goffman not only provided many, many examples from everyday life of its workings, but also took the idea further than Cooley did. Cooley’s version considered only three steps: imagining the view the other’s view of self, the other’s judgment of that view, and finally, the pride or shame that resulted. His version implies that one simply accepts the resultant pride or shame, willy nilly.

But Goffman’s work implies a fourth, vitally important step: how one manages the feelings that result. He suggests that most of the time, we try to avoid them, just as we initially try to manage the view that the other takes. Emotion management is a vital part of impression management. Goffman’s idea of the cult of masculinity provides an example of both types of management : boys learn to manage the impression they make on others as masculine by suppressing the emotions that are assumed to be signs of weakness, the “vulnerable emotions,” and by exaggerating the emotion taken to be a sign of strength, anger. As suggested in Chapter 10, this particular type of impression and feeling management may be a crucial component of the processes leading to either to withdrawal or violence. First noticing, then, by implication, linking the two types of management is one of many examples of Goffman’s penchant for complicating, rather than simplifying representations of human life.

Another example of complexity that can be read into Goffman’s work is the idea of subjective and intersubjective context. Chapter 5 discussed the possibility that in his most difficult book, Frame Analysis, Goffman was moving toward an explicit model of the structure of context. His approach seems to be so complex that it might require mathematical notation in order to avoid vertigo if we are to portray intensely repetitive (iterative) processes.

My analysis of family systems using reports of dialogues in Chapter 9 follows Goffman’s approach by using many concrete examples to vivify general ideas. The results also seem to support Goffman’s highly critical view of relationships in our society. Reasoning from the reported dialogues, most of the families in my study appear to be dysfunctional, or at least use impoverished modes of communication. For example, the frequent report made by many students that they were very close to one of their parents often seemed to be based on rejection of the other parent, an “us and them” configuration on the smallest possible scale.

Of course the study doesn’t prove anything, since my method was not systematic. It is possible that the impression of family dysfunction and disconnection conveyed by the dialogues is merely a sampling artifact, or some other aspect of the procedures I used. Still, it was striking how virtually all the dialogues suggested poor communication practices, and particularly how elementary the mistakes and misunderstandings. Particularly glaring was my impression that almost all the students felt harassed or unappreciated by at least one parent, and that, unknown to the student reporters, how the dialogues also suggested that the students were also part of the problem, harassing and not appreciating their parents in turn.

Using the fine details of actual dialogue as a way of considering a problem is not limited to the interpersonal level. My earlier (1994) studies of the origins of WWI and of Hitler’s appeal to the Germans were both too long to include in this volume. To get some foothold on the causes of WWI, I analyzed and popular poetry and exchanges of letters between heads of state prior immediately prior to the beginning of WWI. To approach the problem of Hitler’s appeal, I investigated details from Hitler’s biography, speeches and writings.

Both the detailed and conventional sources of evidence suggested interpretations that run counter to received wisdom. In the case of World War I the principle cause seems to have been the French leadership and public’s desire for revenge for their defeat in the Franco-German War (1871). A similar thread can be found in Hitler’s appeal to the Germans. His biography, writings and speeches, and the public response, suggest that his main appeal was as an agent of vengeance for the defeat in WWI, and for what the public saw as gross injustice in the way they were treated after the peace.

I believe that the basic thrust of both of these studies is still correct, but given Volkan’s approach to collective violence (2003), and my own recent work on hypermasculinity, summarized in Chapter 10, I would modify some of the details. I think now that the unacknowledged emotions driving gratuitous violence should include not only anger and shame, but all three of the “vulnerable emotions,” which would mean adding grief and fear.

Volkan’s earlier work on focused on the failure to mourn (giving rise to what has been called unresolved grief) as the major cause of collective violence. In the 2003 volume he adds humiliation, and by implication, the acting out of anger. A common thread in the instigation of wars is that instead of mourning their losses (of wars, lives, territory, etc.) leaders and public mask their grief and shame with angry aggression. This proposition may help explain not only the instances of WWI and Hitler’s appeal, but also to the US response to 911 (in Volkan’s apt phrase, our “chosen trauma”).

However, both my earlier work and Volkan’s leaves out the third of the vulnerable emotions, fear. I think that self-amplifying loops of fear are usually causal agents in collective violence. It appears that prior to WWI, the Germans feared being overrun by the powerful coalition of France, Russia, and England, just as those countries feared the power of the German army and the expansive designs of the German leaders. Each side took steps to protect itself against the other, which resulted in further fear, and further preparation, and so on, round and round. The cycle of fear breeding fear gave rise to a level of emotional tension so high as to make war seem inevitable. To complicate matters further, the fear cycle interacts with a similar loop of shame: each country’s actions insulting the other through its retaliatory moves.

Given the unbearably high level of tension in the Europe of 1914, why was there virtually no attempt at negotiations? The assassination of Archduke in the Balkans precipitated the war, but it could have much more reasonably a call to the negotiation table. It seems to me that this issue might remain an enigma to historians unless we consider the results of hypermasculinity on emotion management, and therefore on behavior.

The style of emotion management of the leaders of the belligerent nations, all men, was to disown all of the emotions they and the public were feeling, especially the fear, shame and grief, in favor an aggressive stance toward “the enemy.” Volkan’s theory (2003) suggests that one of the consequences of this kind of emotion management is what he calls “collective regression.” That is, ordinarily sensible adults become irrational. This note is often caught inadvertently in patriotic poems. The following excerpt from “The Charge of the Light Brigade” (1880) provides an example:

Forward, the Light Brigade!" Was there a man dismayed? Not tho' the soldiers knew Someone had blundered: Theirs was not to make reply, Theirs was not to reason why, Theirs was but to do and die…

Tennyson was not complaining about the idiocy of men charging directly into enemy fire waving sabers, but displaying his patriotic fervor for the heroes of the Crimean War. Notice how the men’s disinterest in someone having “blundered” recalls the shades of the US public’s lack of interest in disclosures about 911 and the launching of the Iraq war.

Limitations and Omissions in Goffman’s work.

Some of Goffman’s attempts to reconstruct our views of the social world are evocative, but overall less successful. His ideas about the social nature of the self seem incomplete, since they rule out, by fiat, many aspects of the psychology of the individual person. In this respect his work is at the opposite pole from academic and most clinical psychology. In current psychological work, the social aspects of human life usually get lost. What seems to be necessary is the integration of these two perspectives, rather than having each continue in isolation from the other.

Goffman’s extensive treatments of the social institution of mental illness provides another example of this problem. Like the labeling theory of mental illness, Goffman’s work points to only one layer of the onion, one of the sub-systems that generate conformity to the residual rules, on the one hand, and deviance, on the other.

Similarly, Goffman took a long first step toward integrating emotions into the study of the human condition, particularly the emotion of shame/embarrassment, and in passing, to disgust. However, his purview didn’t include most of the other emotions, such as love, hate, joy, grief, fear, and anger. Similarly, his commentary on relationships, and most of his examples, covered a wide range of the insecurity and disconnectedness of everyday life, but not the opposite realms of secure bonds and moments of connection.

The main focus of Goffman’s work was usually interpersonal, it didn’t explore the linkages between the microworld of interaction and large scale collective process. His analyses of the make-up of the self, total institutions and gender provide hints in this direction, but are neither explicit nor systematic. The later chapters of this book take up this challenge by applying the idea of the looking glass self and impression/emotion management to the generation of collective violence. These chapters suggest how the micro-management of emotions and impressions that produce hypermasculinity and blind patriotism might be repeated, much amplified, in the relationships between nations and ethnic groups.

In order to examine possible links between interpersonal and group conflict, it may be necessary to venture into areas that Goffman didn’t enter. For example, we may need to re-examine many taken-for-granted assumptions about the nature of love, hate, and the bonds between persons and between groups. The vernacular meanings of these words are tropes that function to preserve the status quo. The later chapters in this book examine how defining love, hate, shame, and bonds as concepts might cast light on the meaning of masculinity, nationalism, and more generally on alienation and solidarity in large groups.

To extend the main contours of Goffman’s work on the interaction order to large groups, it may be necessary to imitate his practice of using many, many concrete examples to explore abstract ideas. Typical studies of group structure/process fail, it seems to me, because they do one or the other, but not both. Most historical, demographic and indeed, quantitative work in general tends to be mostly descriptive, providing details, but with little attempt to relate to general ideas. Vast amounts of research effort, for example, are spent on sample surveys that have little or no theoretical framework.

On the other hand, virtually all theoretical studies eschew concrete particulars. The work of G.H. Mead is a clear example. Even Cooley, who provided the occasional concrete example, usually wrote abstractly about general ideas, like the looking glass self. It was Goffman who brought Cooley’s idea to life, because of his extensive use of examples in highly varied situations. In particular, it was his many examples that provided the incentive for conceptualizing a fourth step, the management of emotions. This idea, in turn, provides a path into the vast and confusing world of collective conflict, and the role of hypermasculinity and blind patriotism in gratuitous violence.

The primary key to Goffman’s success, it seems to me, was his reliance on intuition for observing and describing human experience. In this way he was able to first select, then utilize many varied concrete instances in order to develop new and original general ideas. In this way, he avoided premature systematization and premature specialization. His method, in a manner of speaking, was to have no method, or at least no systematic and/or highly specialized method.

As mentioned earlier, one vexing problem with using Goffman’s work is that not only did he have no organized method for dealing with substantive issues, but also that his writing itself lacked sufficient organization. In a somewhat indirect way, the absence of reflexiveness, of self-reference, might be related to this problem. What commentator’s have seen as Goffman’s modesty about himself, the absence of autobiographical detail in his work, may have contributed to the difficulty readers have with understanding his writing.

Reflexive writing, since it is self-referential, encourages one to view one’s writing from the viewpoint of the reader. How will these comments about self appear to a reader? Following from the discussion of looking-glass self dynamics in Chapters 3 and 7, moving between the viewpoint of self and other in a balanced way might be the key to being both original and understandable.

Like many highly creative writers, Goffman’s writing may have been unbalanced in this respect. He was so caught up in expressing his unique vision of the world that he had trouble seeing it from the point of view of the other. This unbalance seems to me to be the main reason that he seldom provides even a single recognizable thesis for any of his studies, let alone repeating it a various levels of abstraction/concreteness.

One of the goals of this book has been the attempt to name central theses for some of Goffman’s studies. For this purpose, in addition to careful re-readings of his work, I have also inserted some aspects of Goffman’s life. I have tried to understand relevant parts of his life in my argument about his work, and in that way making up for his own failure to do so. It seems to me that examining these aspects has helped me identify key theses in his studies, or at least reassure me that I was on the right track.

Even if Goffman’s theses are finally understood, there still remains a final hurdle. Being a trope clearer, his theses represent an affront to current social and behavioral science. As has been pointed out many times, Goffman has nothing to offer to what is often taken to constitute these fields: systematic theory, method and data, usually in some highly specialized discipline or sub-discipline, because his attention is elsewhere.

The problem with premature systematization/specialization is that it makes it virtually impossible for the researcher to use his or her intuitive understanding Commitment to an abstract theory, systematic method, type of data, discipline or sub-discipline at the very beginning of a project virtually rules out important findings. Why is that?

Commitment to one narrow approach weds one to the assumptive world of our society, and therefore to maintaining the status quo. In being systematic in one narrow way, one may be countering one particular trope, but at the same time, one is virtually forced to accept all the other ruling tropes. Systematic and/or discipline-bound studies settle, by and large, for conventional tropes, rather than exploring the prior issue: What new CONCEPTS are relevant to my particular study? The primary issue for all the social and behavior sciences at this point is still conceptual: how can I define my particular problem in a way that uses at least one clearly defined concept?

No matter how systematized the theory, method and data, studying a trope is the road to catastrophe. The vast expenditure of time and effort on self-esteem research, using standardized scales, is an example. As discussed in an earlier chapter, this massive effort has had nothing but trivial results. The basic problem has been the failure of any of the thousands of studies to define what they mean by self-esteem. As already discussed, this trope confounds at least four independent components: predispositional, social, cognitive, and affective elements. Until this confound is clarified, no progress can be made.

Although not on so vast a scale, most systematic studies have followed a similar path. For example, the idea of alienation plays a central role in many theories of society, and has been studied extensively with standardized scales. Yet in spite of Seeman’s demonstration years ago of the many meanings attributed to this idea, alienation remains a trope, like most the other basic ideas in the social and behavioral sciences.

As already indicated, another example of premature specialization is the way both sociological and psychological studies of suicide are mesmerized into disciplinary, rather than interdisciplinary approaches. Each of the disciplines is justifiably proud of the advances that mono-disciplinary approaches have made, so they keep repeating them with virtually no further advances. It appears that the need for integration in the approaches to understanding suicide is a bitter pill, but it must be swallowed.

Given the primitive state of human research and scholarship, what steps can we take that might lead forward? Goffman’s work is suggestive in this respect. Most areas of study still need trope clearing, prior to attempts at systematization.

The first step toward formulating a problem should be conceptual, and therefore intuitive. DO NOT COMMIT TO SOME PARTICULAR FORMAT OF INVESTIGATION BEFOREHAND. Become intimately acquainted with the sites of your problem, firsthand. It is OK to have assistants, but you yourself must be one of the investigators, rather than an absentee landlord. Investigate the problem reflexively. That is, seek to identify and clarify the way in which your own personal background and motives are relevant. Also try to keep in mind the opposite pole, an application to the real world that your solution might have, should you find it. That, formulate a study that is also unrelated to self, but to a problem in the world outside of self. Clearly define at least one concept that will be the focus. Try to define the problem in terms of at least one, and preferably two concepts. This is the step that Goffman never quite completed, and that limits the usefulness of his work. When you began to get promising preliminary results with the initial formulation of the problem, seek to systematize your approach as far as possible. The sign that you have reached the limit of systematization is usually simplification. When your approach begins to lose touch with complexity, you have gone too far.

My own work (1997) on part/whole analysis is a beginning attempt to systematize and integrate Goffmanian and other approaches. Concrete situations, especially those that have been mechanically recorded, and are therefore exasperatingly verbatim, provide the parts that can be then explored using general ideas. For example, I have based much of my work on collective conflict on the earlier extremely detailed studies of unacknowledged shame in psychotherapy sessions by Lewis (1971) and marital quarrels by Retzinger (1991). The intuitive analysis of the least parts of interaction, the words and gestures, seems to be necessary to deconstruct ruling tropes and re-construct new ones. Part/whole analysis of this kind may breath new life into social science.

Combining Part/whole Analysis and the Web Approach involves three steps that Phillips and I agree on. (1)Reflexiveness: using the researcher’s own experiences as background (2) Defining the research problem around at least one clearly defined concept, (3) moving up and down the conceptual ladder of abstraction between concrete situations on the one hand, and theory and social structure/process, on the other. The blending of the two approaches into one should serve to balance the tendency of the Web Approach toward the abstract, and of Part/Whole Analysis toward the concrete. The new scheme may be the next step in line with Goffman’s attempt to free ourselves from entrapment in the vernacular words, images, and ideas of everyday life.

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